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INTRODUCTION
Three little atoms. Three little atoms are all that it took to create the nursery for
what would eventually become life on earth. The simple bonds of two hydrogen atoms
with one oxygen have fostered the development of the world into what it is today. Of the
Earth’s surface 71% is covered by saltwater oceans. Of the total water on the planet only
2.5% is potable water held in lakes, rivers, and ice. Out of the total 2.5% of freshwater,
69% is captured in ice.1 This resource in its desalinated form is pivotal in sustaining life
on earth, not just for humans but also for the other plants and animals that inhabit our
planet. With roughly 60% of the human body being comprised of water, access to clean
sources of water is essential for sustaining life as humans cannot survive more than a
couple of days without it.2 The scarcity of water and its value to sustaining life has made
it an issue for governments charged with securing its accessibility to the population.
Governments are expected to provide water to citizens. However, in addition to
some regions’ limited and declining water availability, as well as the limits of
technology, some governments have been forced to deal with political issues when
considering water distribution. The political question revolves, in part, around whether
water resources are a basic human right or an economic good, i.e., a public good or a
commodity. Also at stake is whether it is more important to provide water efficiently or
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fairly, and how to prioritize water distribution in light of competing needs: industry,
agriculture, and individuals’ personal use. While most governments have maintained
state-sponsored, natural monopolies to provide water utilities, others have chosen to
increase private participation in water distribution. Roughly 7 percent of the urban
populations of developing countries are served by private agents, and the main reasons
for private sector involvement include financial assistance offered by private companies
or international agents, managerial and development expertise held by the private sector,
the ability of private companies to manage cost recovery through tariffs on water, and the
expectation of a more efficient means of water allocation following public failure to meet
their intended goals of universal access.3 The lack of private participation can be seen as
a reflection of government’s acknowledgement of water as a public good and the capitalintensive nature for water appropriation. Needless to say, some countries have chosen to
include private operators or allocate private water rights because of the belief that it will
increase the quality of the distributed resource for a larger quantity of consumers.
The political decisions made by governments are a reflection of the governments’
ideals and their perception of their role in serving the populace. Two common styles of
government influence are populist regimes and more capitalist focused states. The former
see their role as expansive, with government responsibility for providing goods and
services; the latter often see smaller government as more beneficial, with more market
involvement in the distribution of resources. The amount of private sector involvement
for water distribution depends on the ability of either the public or private sector to
3
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distribute resources, the government’s ability to regulate, and their perception towards
private sector allocation.4 Water rights and distribution policies tend to closely correlate
to which kind of government is in place in a given state at any time. This is interesting
because it reflects how even access to the most fundamental resource required for life is
deeply politicized.
In terms of water policy, neither privatization nor public control has emerged as
clearly superior and each has had its share of problems. Those in favor of public sector
provision of the resource stress the government’s responsibility for universal access of
what is considered a public good. They believe that the government is best suited to
finance the infrastructure, and that it is wrong for the citizens to have to pay any outside
provider for such a basic human need. Public sector provision has faced its own
difficulties in providing efficient access to water resources and universal coverage;
however, primarily due to pressures from low-income families to keep prices below
costs, governments have used subsidies to assist in keeping prices down, even if the
poorest portions of the population have not felt the full benefits of these price subsidies.5
This is due to the fact that some of the poorest users of water are not registered customers
or receive their water from the informal market because they cannot afford access to the
government supply.
In response to government failures there has been an emphasis to include the
private sector because of its ability to improve the efficiency and quality of the resource
4
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provided, as well as the belief that the private sector can expand access. However, there
have been cases, for example in Cochabamba, Bolivia in 2000, in which governments
sought private sector participation in water distribution, but due to failures to improve
water distribution, price increases, and public upheaval, they were forced to reestablish
public control over the water system.6 Governments face the complicated situation of
public pressure to provide what is considered by many to be a basic human right, coupled
with the difficulty of ensuring access to the resource throughout the country and
prioritizing its distribution in light of development and economic demands.
Interestingly, far from identifying a universally rational approach for ensuring fair
and efficient water distribution policies, governments tend to choose the policy that is
consistent with their general political and economic ideologies. This is because water
policies and access to water as a basic resource reflect the balance of political and
economic power in a state—so that when private interests rise to power, water will be
privatized and when public forces assume control, it will be publically controlled. In
other words the political and economic influences of a country tend to affect water policy
more than recognition of the resource as a basic human right.

BACKGROUND
In a lot of ways water helped to cultivate civilization; humans’ ability to harness
nature allowed them to develop settlements and food surpluses, the basis of life beyond
subsistence. Irrigation permitted humans to settle in regions that did not have consistent
rainfall or were not directly next to an available water source. The main goal of early
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leadership was how to best consolidate power, and control of water was essential for
domination over nature and a subservient population. The central authority of early
civilizations was charged with organizing the citizenry to develop and maintain irrigation
canals, and in most ancient civilizations—including ancient Chinese, Incan, and African
communities—the populations were obligated to assist.7 Government control over water
resources would continue as history progressed, but as private ownership of land
increased, water rights faced a parallel development.
In most cases water rights were tied directly to land ownership, as was the case
with the permit system used in ancient Rome; however, the actual resource was
publically owned, with ultimate authority residing in the emperor.8 All captured lands
were considered to be part of the public domain, thus for conquered users to obtain access
to water rights, they had to submit to the authority of their new ruler and seek permits for
rights that had previously belonged to them. This reinforced the power and authority of
the empire, which during the establishment of these massive empires was essential for
maintaining control. In Europe, the general policy of tying water rights to land ownership
sustained throughout the feudal period, with control held by the powerful lords and kings.
Around the end of the 18th century, as aristocratic rule began to give way to civil law, and
the middle class/bourgeoisie emerged, the need for explicit water rights was necessary for
privately owned land because leaders now faced populations with growing control and
influence that sought more individual rights. France and the United Kingdom set the
7
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precedent for establishing water rights for private landowners protecting them from “state
interference.”9 However, the property rights to water that were enjoyed by citizens in the
home country were not shared with those taken during colonization.
In many of the lands conquered by these European powers, indigenous
communities had established communal rights to water; but following conquest, they
were forced to adopt the new system brought by the invaders. To maintain control over
the conquered populations, the colonizers emphasized strict authoritarian rule over the
land and other resources like water. The Spanish who took control over most of Latin
America initially followed Pope Alexander VI’s Papal Bull of 1493 that granted the
colonial powers authority over the land discovered through exploration, and the water
therein for domestic and agricultural use.10 With the 1550 Leyes de Indias, the Spanish
government made some concessions to allow greater communal use of water resources,
after observing the benefits of indigenous practices. Control and designation of land by
the colonial powers continued until the 19th century, when the growing presence of
private rights within Europe (including the Napoleonic Code of 1804 in France), led to
the adoption of policies for specifying private water rights, which again worked in the
favor of the colonizers to legally deny natives access to water.11 This is one of the earliest
ways that water policy followed the evolution of economic rights, which increased
emphasis for private property. Throughout the 19th century, agriculture remained the
main user of water, but as people began to struggle in rural areas from lack of available
resources urban cities were increasingly the destination for relocation.
9
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As urbanization expanded in places like Europe and the United States during the
latter part of the 19th century, there was a need for improved sanitation and water
distribution to support the expanding populations in major cities, not only for domestic
use, but also for public health and fire safety.12 In some cases municipal governments
took control over water systems, but there were private providers that supplied
predominately to wealthier areas. The growth of wealth led to an emerging demand for
more sophisticated water services, spurring private companies looking to meet the
increased demand and serve those who could afford it. However, concern over the
unequal distribution of water led to public outcry, especially in low income and rural
communities. Another major factor for increased pressure on local governments to
control water provision, were the health concerns related to the lack of adequate water
distribution and sanitation, which had at the time resulted in outbreaks of cholera and
typhoid. This burden to improve distribution, along with the lack of incentive for private
companies to seek universal expansion to constituents who could not afford the necessary
price increases, led local governments to take the lead in providing water resources to the
larger portion of society. The advantages to establishing a natural monopoly/state
sponsored provider included the ability to finance the major infrastructure costs for both
freshwater and sanitation services through tax collection, provide subsidies to artificially
keep prices down for low income consumers, and the option to acquire additional funds
from the federal government if needed.13 By the end of the 19th century governments
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tended to control both the rights and distribution of water, with the exception of England
and France who would later provide examples for private sector involvement.
Government management of water resources continued as governments increased
their power and influence throughout the 20th century, but as the century drew to a close,
municipal authorities would soon realize some of the same difficulties that their private
sector counterparts had previously experienced. Some of the issues that the local
providers faced were continued limited access—especially to the poor, costs that
exceeded returns by tariffs, management issues including overstaffing, and crumbling
infrastructure.14 The difficulty in providing universal access to water was felt by both
developed and developing countries. Problems with the provision of many basic services
to the population and general discontent, offered opportunities to many leftist
governments seeking power and increased government influence.
With platforms focused on aiding the poor and decreasing income inequality,
through projects like agrarian reform, socialist governments with populist leaders came to
power in several countries, especially in Latin America (much to the concern of the
United States). This shift to left-wing regimes led to several issues such as hyperinflation,
stagnant or negative economic growth, and problems of debt. In some cases, these
problems led to military takeovers of the government or a political shuffling of power,
but in the period that followed, developing countries would have to appease the western,
developed world and adopt neoliberal doctrine in order to receive much needed financial
assistance.

14
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Developing countries that needed international investment to sustain their
programs were now confronted with conditions on international financing, requiring
economic and political liberalization. In what became known as the Washington
Consensus developing countries were expected to implement certain measures: fiscal
discipline, improved public expenditure priorities, tax reform, financial liberalization,
floating exchange rates to improve exports, trade liberalization, increased foreign direct
investment, privatization of state enterprises, removal of barriers to entry, a system to
secure intellectual property rights, and reduced state involvement in the market.15 Under
these guidelines some countries saw economic growth and increased involvement of the
domestic and international private sector. Under one of the parameters, “privatization of
state enterprises”, there was an increase in private sector investment in utilities and other
infrastructure projects, and in some countries the allocation of water rights to private
actors.

METHODS
When discussing water privatization it is important to differentiate between the
privatization of water rights, and the privatization of water distribution. Establishing
water rights or water markets, is a tool that has been shown to go all the way back to the
permits that were granted by the Roman empire to private land owners. However, current
trends have separated water rights and land rights, with the belief that water, “needs to be
transferable and marketable for it to be used in an economically efficient way, producing
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the highest possible marginal returns.”16 The most important aspect of water rights is that
they serve as a reliable and secure asset that the private sector can control.
When the transfer and exchange of rights in a market is included in the definition
of water rights there is a shift from considering water as a basic human right, to
considering it as an economic good. At the International Conference on Water and the
Environment, held in Dublin, Ireland on the 26-31 of January 1992, there was a
discussion amongst 500 participants—including government designated experts from a
hundred countries and representatives of eighty international organizations—regarding
the current state of water use.17 From this conference arose one of the more controversial
ideas that, “Water has an economic value in all of its competing uses and should be
recognized as an economic good”.18 Part of the controversy is caused by the people that
fail to address the additional conditions associated with this principle from the
conference, which states, “it is vital to recognize first the basic right of all human beings
to have access to clean water and sanitation at an affordable price.”19 While the Dublin
Statement has usually been referenced to support the development of water markets or
privatization, it still recognizes a human right to water, but stresses that the allocation of
that right is done by the most efficient means available.
Ten years after the Dublin Statement, the UN released another document stressing
the human right to water as a staple, “for leading a life of human dignity. It is a
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prerequisite for the realization of other human rights.”20 This document has since led to
standing within the UN General Assembly establishing water as a basic human right to be
guaranteed by the state.21 Even though the state is responsible for ensuring a basic human
right to water for its population, there is no specification for how to achieve that goal.
Therefore, states that choose to use private sector participation in water distribution are
within the limitation of the statute as long as the goal is for universal access to clean
water and sanitation. There are several ways that states can include private companies in
water distribution with varying degrees of divesture to the private sector.
In large part the question facing countries has been to what extent should the state
incorporate the private sector in addressing water allocation issues? The inclusion of the
private sector has often come as a result of government failures to secure distribution,
maintain quality, and support the necessary infrastructure that is so often capital
intensive. The different forms of private sector involvement are demonstrated in the table
below.22
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The most basic relationship that a government can have with the private sector is
through service, management and lease contracts. In all three cases the government is
hiring the private company to assist in some aspect of the daily operation of water
provision. Management and lease agreements are slightly more involved because they
give more control to the private company than a service contract by putting the private
company in charge of day-to-day services and not just specific tasks. 23 Lease agreements
differentiate from management deals, because in addition the private company handles
the collection of revenues. Also due to the short duration of these agreements there is
increased competition for contracts, and depending on the agreed upon method of
compensation, private companies are inclined to improve on the quantity and quality of
the service it provides. This can be beneficial to a country that does not have the expertise
or the budget to run facilities on its own. It can also be the preferred option for a
government that is seeking to maintain greater control over water. From 1990-2011 there
were 31 management or lease contracts in Latin America, with a total investment of five
million dollars.24 In other cases, governments choose to go with options where the private
company helps to finance projects and maintain or build infrastructure.
Agreements between governments and private companies that require greater
private investment fall into three categories: concession, Greenfield projects also known
under various conditions as Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) projects, and complete
divesture. In all three cases the private company is asked to make an investment in
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maintaining or developing infrastructure for water distribution, thus the contracts tend to
be longer to “to allow the operator to recoup its investment”25. The difference is that in a
concession contract, the company is only in charge of maintaining infrastructure and not
for developing new systems. Greenfield and divesture projects can be a preferred option
for countries that do not have the established infrastructure; this is predominantly the case
with sanitation infrastructure. From 1990-2011 there were 137 concession contracts with
a total investment of $15.428 billion, 48 Greenfield projects with a total investment of
$3.429 billion, and 12 divesture agreements with a total investment of $7.924 billion. The
large numbers of concession contracts demonstrate how in a lot of cases the infrastructure
is already in place, but there is a need for a provider to ensure its maintenance and
management. From the data it can also be extrapolated that countries are hesitant to give
up total control of a resource that is considered a basic human right. It would be expected
that the countries that chose divesture would have a greater likelihood of developing
water markets because it is granting control of the resource to a private provider, so
private distribution of rights is likely. In all cases there has been a slowing of private
investment since the late 1990’s and this can be attributed to the realization of difficulties
in implementing private sector involvement and waning support for the Washington
Consensus. Coincidentally in Latin America, there have been some governments that
have seen power shifting away from more liberal governments to more nationalistic
regimes.
In Latin America there have been both strong populist governments as well as
pressures to liberalize economic and political policy—especially by international
25
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financiers. Geographically issues arise due to the conflict of apparent water abundance in
certain regions, the world’s longest mountain range, and also some of the driest places on
the planet—the Atacama Desert in Chile receives roughly an inch of rainfall annually
(some places have no record of precipitation).

26

The region has received support from

many international agents seeking to help with development and looking to invest in the
vast resources that the countries have to offer. The three countries of Chile, Mexico, and
Uruguay, demonstrate the various policies that governments will choose when deciding
how to allocate water distribution through the private or public sector, and their decisions
are a reflection of their economic and political tendencies. Chile has led the region in
privatization and economic liberalization since the military took over in 1973, with
continued progress by the civilian government that took over power in 1990. Mexico had
75 years of single party rule under a strong federal government, but has opened up to
economic liberalization in the last two decades due to economic pressure. Finally,
Uruguay with its history as essentially a welfare state influenced global water policy
when it chose to make the right to water a constitutional right in 2004. The proceeding
chapters will show that for these three countries, their water policies are correlated to
their economic and political direction.
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CHILE
Chile is a strong case for showing that water policy correlates with political and
economic prerogatives, despite the resource’s importance for sustaining human life. As
the country has seen changes in political power towards more authoritarian and central
influences, its water policy has reflected that and fallen under greater government control.
However, as the government shifted its focus towards a decentralized state government
and a dedication to economic privatization, water policy again followed with the
development of water markets and private distribution of water. These changes exemplify
how water policy has been more closely related to the influences of those in power than
to what is considered the government’s responsibility for serving the needs of the
population.
On September 18, 1810 Chile declared independence from Spain. After several
years of fighting, a new nation emerged under the leadership of Bernardo O’Higgins. The
government under O’Higgins and all those that followed have had to contend with the
powerful oligarchy, which established itself under Spanish rule. The power of the
wealthy, and the income gap between the rich and the poor, has perpetually been an
unresolved issue in the country. Another element that has been pivotal to Chile’s
economic success is its natural resources, which it has exported to world markets. The
vast possibility for natural resource exploitation is a reflection of the dynamic geography
exemplified in Chile, consisting of the driest desert in the world—the Atacama Desert in
the North, massive glaciers and relative water abundance in the South, and the Andes
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which stretch the length of this long, skinny country. These elements have influenced
political and economic decisions throughout Chile’s history and will continue into the
future. The changes that the country has seen in its economy, and the different roles of
the federal government, have played a crucial role in determining its water policy. The
correlation of these changes makes Chile an ideal example to show that water policy is
tied to the economic and political conditions within a country. The water policy of Chile
has been the subject of extensive literature on the success of water privatization, but it has
not necessarily been able to achieve all of the government’s goals.
The Chilean political system has experienced periods of representative democracy
as well as political turmoil and military takeovers. The policies that have been enacted by
the various governments have been a reflection of Chile’s position within the global
market and the regimes that have been in power at the time. Furthermore, the economic
and political conditions in the country have shaped the policies that have been established
regarding water, and these policies have reflected the interests of those in power over
other concerns. The first official document that had a focus on water was the 1855 Civil
Code. This document specified particular rights to individuals and to the collective
national interests. In doing so, it drew a distinction between public and private water
rights. A small portion of water rights were administered to private individuals based on
water within property boundaries and those flowing through manmade channels, which
was intended to encourage private irrigation, but gave an advantage to wealthy
landowners.27 The remaining water was categorized “national property for public use”
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granting access to all of the nation’s citizens.28 With control of water held by the public,
certain concessions were made to grant private users rights to use the water, but final
control was held by the state to modify the permit or cancel without compensating the
user. This control by the state over water resources was a holdover from colonial rule
where the crown or local governments were responsible for resources and their
proliferation to individual users. The political tendency at the time continued to maintain
considerable control in the central government, which also sought the expansion of
natural resource trade with international powers. The export driven economic approach
led Chile to specialize in several exports, one of the most significant being nitrate, which
at the time was used for fertilizer. The country had a considerable advantage in exporting
this resource following the War of the Pacific and the conquering of rich mineral lands
formerly held by Peru and Bolivia. Due to this expansion in exports it experienced
significant economic growth.
The nitrate boom lasted until the beginning of World War I, when artificial
fertilizers were created, making nitrate an obsolete export, and forcing Chile to again
revert to primarily exporting copper. The loss of nitrate exports and the Great Depression
decimated the Chilean economy—the League of Nations labeled Chile as the hardest hit
by the Great Depression.29 In an effort aimed at recovery the country began the practice
of Import Substitution Industrialization, to strengthen domestic markets and decrease
dependence on foreign markets. Under this policy, the country experienced some
economic growth and consolidated power in the central government once again. With a
28
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more central role of the government, it created the 1951 Water Code to establish specific
water rights.
Water was distributed in terms of “rights of advantageous use”, this required users
to register for rights to use water with the Real Estate Title Offices, but once rights were
established they were treated as private property. 30 The code also called for the creation
of the General Water Directorate (DGA) to serve as the agency in charge of
administering rights and keeping record (the DGA was not actually created until 1969).
There were several conditions on these use rights including new use of the water resource
required the approval by the DGA, rights were granted on a first-come-first-serve basis,
and the failure to appropriately use the right for a period of five years would result in a
cancelation of the right.31 The creation of this water code was a reflection of the growing
belief in the importance of private property rights and that they should be protected by a
strong central state. The protection of these rights by the federal government proved most
beneficial to the wealthy that already had ownership of large land titles and limited access
to the landless poor. However, when government policies failed to improve the economic
problems faced by Chile’s lower class, leftist governments gained political favor by
promising equality reform for the poor—especially in agriculture.
The failures of the government to address major economic issues, led to the
mobilization of the rural and urban poor. The political response to this movement was the
establishment of the Christian Democracy party as well as the resurgence of the
communist and socialist parties. With the promise of agrarian reform aimed at helping the

30
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poor, Eduardo Frei Montalva of the Christian Democracy party came to power in 1964.
The Agrarian Reform Law of 1967, which in turn led to the 1967 Water Code, had two
primary objectives: to administer the redistribution of lands to the poor and improve
irrigation efficiency. The new water code stipulated that all water—including those that
had been distributed to private users under the previous laws—was “national property for
public use”, allowing the government to confiscate the rights to water, without
compensating the previous users, and redistribute them according to “standards of
rational and beneficial use”.32
Three years later the communist and socialist candidate, Salvador Allende, was
elected president with the support of the Christian Democratic Party. Following the
election, the new president oversaw an expansion in agrarian reform and major increases
in fiscal spending to support welfare programs for the poor. In addition to the reforms
established under Allende, there was massive nationalization of the country’s industries
and utilities. In many conditions these takeovers were done without compensation to the
foreign companies that had previously controlled them. These policies led to huge
national debts and skyrocketing inflation that was highly unpopular within the middle and
upper classes. The policy regarding water is clearly reflected in the political and
economic direction that Allende was leading the country towards with central
government control; however, this would not last long as the military was pressured by
the middle and upper class to intervene and regain control of the government.
The military coup on September 11, 1973 led by General Augosto Pinochet
established a military dictatorship that would run the country until it returned power to
32
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civilian authorities in 1990. During this 17-year period Chile saw a drastic transformation
in its economic policy, which was dominated by privatization and neoliberal policies that
were proposed by a group named “los Chicago Boys”—a group of students who studied
at the University of Chicago under Milton Friedman and returned to Chile where they
implemented neoliberal economic reform. By 1980 the military government had redrafted
the constitution to reflect many of the policies towards increased privatization, especially
in securing rights to private property and limiting government intervention. The
following year the government enacted the Water Code of 1981 to reflect the marketoriented direction of the country.
The new water code established private use rights to water through strict
specifications of private property under the belief that individual property rights would
result in the creation of water markets and the open transfer of use rights, moving water
to the highest value user. The intention of these policies was to encourage users to
conserve water and distribute it in the most efficient way possible by establishing water
as an economic good with commercial value. The establishment of this code directly
correlated with the goal of the national economy and political direction of the country
towards privatization. The neoliberal economists who had developed the new economic
policies for neoliberal reforms were directly involved in the establishment of a laissezfaire system for water rights; however, it turned out to be less effective than anticipated.
The Chilean experience with water markets and water privatization has often been
used as the example to follow for other countries considering or encouraged to seek water
privatization. The explicit separation of water rights from property rights into
commodities that can be traded, sold, and transferred, created a framework that has been
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credited with the expansion of water services to almost all of the population, and
improvements in water quality within Chile. Several elements that are considered
essential to the effective use of water markets include transparency of the legal conditions
pertaining to the market, definitive private property rights, minimum government
intervention, and effective means for the transfer of rights.33 In Chile the exchange of
rights has predominately existed between agriculture users—in some cases as lease
agreements for the temporary use of rights for agricultural cultivation, and from the
agriculture sector to industrial users.
The establishment of water rights has also led to the specification of consumptive
and non-consumptive rights. The consumptive rights are for irrigation, domestic, and
industrial uses, while non-consumptive rights require the return of all water back to the
source with the intention being to promote hydroelectric development, which is one of
the highest generators of energy in the country.34 One of the most significant benefits
credited to the privatization of water rights, is the local improvement of some
infrastructure and increases in private investment.35 However, amid the presumed
benefits associated with Chilean water rights and water markets, there are several experts
who criticize the water code for failing to achieve its intended goals.
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One of the most common critiques of the Chilean water market is the limited
activity of water rights transactions through the market.36 The lack of initial data led
many early researchers of the market method to call the developments in Chile a success,
but later empirical research has shown that exchanges have been much less frequent than
stated, or anticipated. Some of the proposed explanations for these limitations are
geography, a lack of definitive records regarding ownership of rights, issues with farmers
in terming water as a commodity, and inconsistency in price determination for the rights
thus complicating the exchange.37 Many water rights holders have not been inclined to
transfer their rights because of the complications regarding price signals, as well as the
lack of transfer mechanisms, and the option to speculate or hoard without consequence to
prepare for droughts.38
In addition to the lack of activity in the water market, the other problems that have
arisen since the implementation of the Water Code in 1981 are failures to account for
social, environmental and economic issues. One concern with the current system centers
on the conflicts in river basins between both consumptive and non-consumptive uses,
which have not been definitively resolved by either the DGA or the legal system.39 There
have been some developments to Chilean water policy since the establishment of the
Water Code in 1981, addressing shortfalls within the water code, while at the same time
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increasing privatization and distribution of water to private companies, but they have not
solved all of the indicated problems.
Following the plebiscite of 1988 and the resounding “No” that General Pinochet
received from the people of Chile, the government transitioned into the control of the
Concertación, which is a center-left coalition of political parties that formed to oppose the
conservatives supported by the military in the transition to civilian control.

The

Concertación opposed several of the policies that were established under the military
dictatorship, but has accepted the economic model out of fear of alternatives, and
conditions put on the turnover of control established by the military government.40 By
maintaining the economic principles of neoliberalism the Concertación has overseen the
privatization of the country’s largest water distribution and sanitation companies.
In many cases, the companies that were bought out by foreign investors were
relatively strong and well established in their regions, but the influence of foreign capital
for investment in maintenance and additional infrastructure enticed Chile to open these
utilities providers to foreign management. The private sector has also participated in BOT
and divestiture projects, especially to provide expanded sanitation services. The inclusion
of these private companies has resulted in the increase of prices for water, which has
angered those who believe that water is a basic human right that should be provided by
the government at or below cost. In response the government has establishing a direct
subsidy system for local utility companies to help support those families that are
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determined to have financial need and hold a Social Classification Card.41 The
government has also provided subsidies for infrastructure projects, which shows that the
implementation of privatization has not achieved its fully anticipated financial benefits.
Although Chile remains the example for other developing countries seeking to
implement water privatization, there is growing evidence to show that the policy has not
been as successful as planned. There are concerns regarding the environment and social
impact of the policy, which remain issues in the country to this day. However, due to
Chile’s strong economic and political belief in market systems, it is unlikely that their
policy towards water will change in the near future—no matter what political party is in
power. For the purposes of demonstrating a correlation of water policy to economic and
political tendencies, Chile is a good example because it has demonstrated changes at
critical transitions in the government’s direction. However, the changes to the water laws
have not always proven to be the most beneficial to the society nor have they met all of
the desired outcomes. Adhering to a neoliberal economic platform has led to the
exclusion of some of the more vulnerable members of society, and dominance over water
rights by more powerful private industries that use significant amounts of water for other
projects; this is especially relevant for the mining sector. The influence of public and
private interests in changing Chile’s water policy to match their prescribed direction for
the country have brought about some improvements to the water system, but there are
still issues that remain in addressing the needs of the entire population.
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MEXICO
The case of Mexico is probably the least effective in demonstrating the correlation
of water policy to changes in government because authoritarian regimes have sustained
control for large portions of the country’s history. The changes that have occurred, like
the other cases of Chile and Uruguay, have been influenced by economic influences
outside of the country and government failures to provide a sustainable resource to the
people. Mexico continues to have some of the worst water problems, despite its
implementation of some private involvement. Additionally, its inability to financially
support new or improved water systems has limited the government’s involvement.
Without a definitive policy and viable credit, the country will continue to deplete its fresh
water resources through bad practices and deteriorating infrastructure.
Mexico has for a long time been an influential country in Latin America, in part
due to the resources that it has exported to the international market, the historical legacy
left behind by the Spanish, and its proximity to the U.S. Formerly known as “New
Spain”, Mexico was a critical piece of the Spanish empire because of its gold and silver
deposits. Following the country’s independence in 1810, its economy shifted to include a
greater role for agriculture. Politically it has seen periods of turmoil, including a bloody
civil war, and a long authoritarian rule by a single political party. Then near the end of
the 20th century, Mexico, like many other Latin American countries, began to implement
neoliberal adjustments. All of these conditions have affected the country’s water policy.
However, the physical characteristics in Mexico have further complicated water policy.
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The northern and central portion of the country, which is home to 60% of the
population and 70% of generated GDP, only receives 25% of the annual precipitation.42
This scarcity has made water an essential element of government policy, but at the same
time it remains a highly undervalued resource within the country. Considering the
developments within the federal government and its complimentary economic decisions,
Mexico shows some of the same tendencies as Chile towards adjusting water policy to
match changes in governance and economic focus; however, the long standing tradition
of authoritarian control continues to influence policy, even as the government has
adopted principles of decentralization, changing its water policy.
The history of Mexico demonstrates the adhesion to strong central control of
water; even though prior to Spanish control indigenous groups established communal
irrigation systems that were maintained outside of a central authority. These indigenous
groups also held water in higher regard, with uses for religious and cultural ceremonies.
However, once the Spanish took control, all water rights were taken by the crown and
administered for use by the representatives of the Spanish royalty. After independence in
1821, control over water remained within the central government, and previously
allocated water rights by “local governments and large landowners” remained unchanged.
43

During the 50 years following independence, the country experienced extensive
political unrest, until Porfirio Diaz, who ruled from 1876-1911, assumed control. Under
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his leadership, land was consolidated in the hands of the elite that supported Diaz, leaving
75% of the population landless.44 The Diaz government also sought foreign investment
and made concessions that appealed to the United States and other investors. An 1888
law placed lakes and rivers under the state’s control, but opposition from the landholding
elite led to the establishment of an 1894 statute that explicitly gave the government
control to grant water use rights of the nationally held resource.45 The water policies
correlated with the political policy of authoritarian consolidation and the influence of
wealthy landowners, while ignoring the needs of the large, landless population. This was
an unsustainable policy, as the wealth and land holdings of a very small group inspired
revolution by the impoverished majority in 1910.
After seven years of bloody conflict the revolution began to draw to a close and a
new constitution was written. Within the constitution were several articles regarding
water policy, in particular Article 27 that stated, “The Nation is owner of all water within
its territory, with a few exceptions, and authorizes the government to administer these
resources and grant ‘concessions’ for water use.”46 This policy was similar to the one
prior because water authority remained within the central government; however, the
constitution intended to break up the large landholdings of the elite and redistribute them
to the poorer population, into what were called ejidos. The law would then grant the
government authority to concede water rights to the poor living on the newly distributed
land, but these intentions were not met until several years later.
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The new constitution established legal precedence for the improved social
standing of the poor; however, when land distribution actually occurred, those most
desperate and dependent were left out of the concessions. Instead the federal government
granted the land rights to the developing middle class because it was presumed that they
would make better use of it. Several years later, in 1926, government control over water
provision was enhanced with the establishment of the Irrigation Law and subsequent
Comisión Nacional de Irrigación (National Commission for Irrigation, CNI). This was a
governmental organization created by President Calles dedicated to meeting the need for
extended irrigation to the rural ejidos.47 The continued dominance by the upper class and
the authoritarian government ended up resulting in little real change for the majority of
the population. This poor majority also saw a drastic increase in population, as thousands
of Mexicans were forcefully deported from the United States following the Great
Depression. It was not until 1934, under the leadership of President Cárdenas, that there
was legitimate attention given to supporting the rural poor and granting them actual land
rights through the ejido system.
The Cárdenas administration was the first to successfully provide the poor with
rights to land as intended in the 1917 Constitution. By the end of his term as president,
land controlled by ejidos increased from 16% to 60%.48 Although there was no new law
passed regarding water policy, Cárdenas was the first to implement the constitution for
the betterment of the poor population and use the policies already in place to facilitate
social benefits, which would require an expansion of water access. He achieved this by
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appealing to the lower class on an extensive campaign, where he reached out to many
poor citizens throughout the country. His populist regime was supported by those less
fortunate within the country that wanted to see a government that would meet the needs
of the people. Another influential policy that he implemented was the nationalization of
Mexico’s petroleum resources, which has been vital to the internal industrialization of the
country.
Following the reforms of President Cárdenas, the middle of the 20th century saw
control of water policy held in the government organization titled the Ministry of Water
Resources. The ministry succeeded in implementing several policies regarding water. It
established river basin agencies to control local resources, oversaw the creation of the
Federal Waters Law in 1972, and developed the first National Water Plan in 1976.49
Throughout this time period, control of water allocation and irrigation maintenance
remained within the federal government’s domain. Simultaneously Mexico was under the
tight control of a single political party, the Partido Revolutionario Institucional
(Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI), which controlled elections and eliminated
political opposition up until the 2000 election. The single control of this one party is a
testament to the power held by the state, and this dominance was reflected in water policy
as well.
Things would become more difficult in Mexico during the 1980’s, when it and
many other countries in the region, were hit by major economic decline and a regional
debt crisis. As the economy worsened, the government increasingly lost the ability to
fund irrigation projects. Coupled with this decline in available financing for new
49
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projects—as well as repairs to old—there was a growing bureaucracy in control of water.
The complications to water policy led to the decline in services and quality of the
resource. Additionally, the government continued to miss the expectation of the
population of increased water access. For a long time, the government had artificially
kept the price of water low to help lower income families maintain access; however, the
lack of cost recovery was a major influence for the divesture of irrigation development
responsibility to local Water User Associations through a process called Irrigation
Management Transfer (IMT) during the 80’s and 90’s.
The proposal of IMT sought to increase the involvement of local users by
designating them in charge of their local irrigation systems, so they were now more
thoroughly invested in its development and success. While control of irrigation was given
to the water users themselves, or to the collective groups that used the resource,
municipal governments were put in charge of “providing potable water services,
treatment, and drainage.”50 The divesture of control correlates with the growing
economic trend within Mexico towards neoliberalization. As the country began to
decentralize its economy, financial institutions and its northern neighbor, the United
States, encouraged it to adopt policies like those stated in the Washington Consensus.
The economic problems also spurred the growing influence of opposition parties against
the PRI. As there was a decrease in government control, there was a consistent
decentralization of water policy as well.
The next major water policy was the 1992 Ley de Aguas Nacionales (National
Water Law), which continued the trend of decreased government involvement. This law
50

Adelson, pg. 3

31

did several things, one of the first being that it redefined Article 27 of the constitution so
that rural farmers involved in ejidos would have legal title to their land and could thus
sell or rent it at their discretion, as well as leverage it for credit.51 The law established the
National Water Commission (CONAGUA) as the administrator of water policy. It was
charged with increasing access to clean water and sanitation, controlling the entire
production and management of dams, and creating a registry for water use permits.52
These were different than those used in other countries due to the continued state
influence and involvement in Mexican water rights, the duration of water rights being 30
years with government authority to take away the concession if it was demonstrated that
the resource was not being put to good use, and the establishment of a specific
consideration for not harming the environment.
This law also came about shortly after Mexico’s agreement to join the GATT in
1986 and before further economic liberalization when Mexico joined NAFTA in 1994.53
The increased competition brought on by free trade with the U.S. and Canada, forced
Mexico to seek improvements to efficiency since agricultural products, especially corn
from the US was subsidized and subsequently cheaper than locally grown alternatives.
The 1992 change in water policy is in direct correlation to the continued shift in
economic and political ideals of the Mexican government, which moved to a much more
decentralized role and followed the guidance of economic neoliberalization.
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Following these changes there have been some positive improvements in water
distribution with an estimated 14 million gaining access to piped water and 16 million
added to sanitation provision.54 However, despite these seemingly impressive
improvements to water services, there are serious issues that still exist regarding the
effective distribution of clean and reliable water. The decentralization of irrigation
control by the federal government occurred at a period in time when the systems of
irrigation in the country needed serious improvements; it was estimated that half of the
water supplied through irrigation systems never reached its target destination.55
Furthermore, while there is evidence of an increase in access, it has not always been
dependable or consistent, and the quality of water has had some serious health concerns.
The IMT, which was intended to give greater control to local water users and have them
personally invest in water projects, currently faces a dire need for federal financial
support to improve irrigation systems and reduce water losses. Part of the problem with
these irrigation districts is that they do not have sufficient cost recovery and tariff rates
are too low to be efficient or attract private, outside financing.56 There have been some
cases of private participation, as well as concessions, BOT programs, and management
contracts, but many of these initiatives have failed to be completed due to poor project
planning, contractual ambiguity, and again the lack of available credit in these areas due
to poor cost recovery.57
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Mexico has the potential to develop and improve its water resource sector, but to
do so will require continued increases in prices for a resource that many consider to be a
public good. With about three quarters of water use still dedicated to agriculture, it is
important changes be made to improve irrigation, as well as to provide a more reliable
and higher quality product to all members of the growing population.58 The historical
tendency of water policy to follow the trends of economic and political policy could
mean that improvements are hinged upon changes in governance. However, for the
government to make strides in reaching its goals of better serving the population, it will
likely need to initially increase involvement in the system that it largely sought to remove
itself from with the adoption of water laws in the late 80’s and 90’s. There is a need for
change, and it remains to be seen who will be responsible for implementing it. Mexico
demonstrates how economic and political influences helped to sway water policy to a
more decentralized role after a legacy of authoritarian control. However, there has not
been as profound a change in policy as was seen in Chile. The change remains subtler
because the government in Mexico continues to maintain a central influence on policy,
and that can be attested to the legacy of a powerful central government. Yet, even with
the sustained government influence in water distribution, lingering problems raise the
question whether divesture would help to facilitate improvements, or would lead to
further exclusion of those who cannot afford increases in water prices to cover costs.
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URUGUAY
Uruguay is a strong case to support the correlation of water policy to political and
economic conditions within the country. The federal government has been the central
provider of goods and services within the country and only during times of outside
influence and economic pressure has it sought to change its role. With the influential role
of the government in overseeing the needs of the population, the country’s water policy
long remained unchanged with central control of the resource. However, when the
country faced economic pressure to reduce the government’s role, there was a
complimentary shift in water policy, allowing for private provision. The inclusion of
private companies in distributing water was unpopular amongst most of the population,
and they have since sought to eliminate any private involvement in water utilities. From
theses changes it is evident how water policy has correlated with economic and political
shifts within the country.
Uruguay is the second smallest country in South America and has a climate that
has been ideal for sustaining an economy based in agriculture and animal husbandry,
under which the country saw early periods of strong economic growth. Following the
selection of the first president of the country, there have been two dominant political
parties, the Colorados and the Blancos—with some other parties developing later. The
political dichotomy of these two parties has led to several conflicts between them, which
have resulted in some violent outbreaks, but usually concluded with mutual agreements
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and power sharing.59 The central role of the government has played a pivotal role in
ensuring rights and services for its citizens, even earning the title the “Switzerland of
Latin America”.60 Throughout Uruguay’s history the state has been responsible for
providing for the needs of the people, and that can be seen in the country’s water policy.
Based on this connection of water policy to governance, when the role of the
government has changed there has been a corresponding change in the water policy, thus
making Uruguay a good example of the correlation of water policy to government
ideology. The citizens of Uruguay have grown accustomed to and developed an
expectation that the state will provide for them basic necessities including water, so when
that has changed, the people have usually not supported the departure from government
allocation of water.
There have been some changes to water policy as a result of economic and
political pressure from outsiders, but predominantly the people of Uruguay have enjoyed
state control over water resources. This state provision has benefited the largely
agricultural based economy, which primarily focuses on animal husbandry and some
agricultural products including rice, soybeans, and cellulose from timber. The country’s
dedication to these exports can be seen in its allocation of water resources, where in
2000, 87% of water use was directed for agriculture.61 Support for agriculture dates back
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to 50 years after the country’s independence with the adoption of the Código Rural (Rural
Code) in 1875.
The Código Rural in 1875 was the first time that there was an explicit mention of
water in Uruguayan law. The Rural Code roughly stipulated that water use was tied to
land use.62 The law was left intentionally vague because at the time there were not many
needs for explicit regulations of water use due to the relative abundance of water, and
limited exclusionary uses by one user over another since it was a small population that
had relative ease in accessing land. The lack of water scarcity, in conjunction with the
social welfare provisions, provided predominantly by the Colorado party, led to little
need for major changes to water policy. The government supported the water needs of the
people, establishing the expectation for government provision of resources. However,
poor economic growth and increased political conflict, escalated by problems of droughts
and flooding, led to a rise of leftist political groups and civil unrest, culminating in a
military coup in 1973.63/64
Instead of allowing the leftist political groups to establish control or let the
country fall into disarray, the military implemented greater government control. The
increased role of the government reinforced the country’s policy of resource management
with the creation of the Código de Agua (Water Code) in 1975. Article three of the code
established the federal government as the authority in charge of water as it pertained to
formulating a national plan for water, designating uses for water by private and public
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users, creating priorities for certain regions to gain access to water, mandating the right of
the state to revoke rights to water in cases of drought, and finally to determine fees for
water use in irrigation or by industry.65 These regulations for water were a reflection of
the increased role that the military sought for the government. The rule of the military
government lasted for 13 years until civil power returned in 1986, under President Julio
María Sanguinetti, and this corresponded with a decrease in central government
authority, as well as the divesture of water services in two important water departments.
While the return to civil government was a success for Uruguayan democracy, the
timing was less than ideal, as most of Latin America and Uruguay had fallen into a major
financial debt crisis. Seeking the aid of industrialized nations and other international
finance institutions, countries were required to implement conditions provided by the
Washington Consensus—including privatization. The successive governments that
followed the military dictatorship in Uruguay were charged with the difficult task of
having to adopt these neoliberal reforms to receive financial support from abroad, which
led to changes in its water policy.
In 1992 water privatization began in the wealthiest of the 19 water regions, the
Maldonado Department.66 That same year a Uruguayan labor movement developed a
referendum to voice public opinion against privatization; the plebiscite received support
from 70-80% of the population.67 However, in spite of the public’s outspoken disapproval
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of privatizing water, the government continued to seek out private partnerships for water
distribution. The dominant multinational corporations that were involved in water
provision were Aguas de la Costa, which was controlled by the colossal French company
Suez under its subsidiary Aguas de Barcelona, and Uragua, which was a subsidiary of the
Spanish company Aguas de Bilbao.68 The majority of water in Uruguay was still
provided by the state owned water company, Obras Sanitarias del Estado (OSE), but the
granting of concessions to private providers was a direct result of economic pressure by
international financial agencies to incorporate neoliberal principles, despite the fact that
they led to more problems than benefits. Even though the population did not support
these policies, nor were they necessarily in the best interests of the citizenry, they
remained the option chosen by the government during the 90’s and the beginning of the
21st century.
The 1994 and 1999 presidential elections saw the growing influence of the leftist
political party Frente Amplio (Broad Front) in response to continued economic failures
under the dominant parties, which were escalated by economic problems in Brazil and
Argentina. The increased support for the Broad Front party was sparked by the reduction
in services provided by the state, which was seeking neoliberal reforms and a
decentralization of the government’s role in allocating civil services. In terms of water
policy, the private companies that had taken over control of water services in two of the
country’s provinces were failing to meet the conditions agreed upon in their contracts.
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Rather than meeting contractual deadlines for service improvements or paying fees to the
state, the companies revised their contracts so that the state was paying for losses
incurred by the private firms.69 Additionally, many customers lost access to water
because of their inability to pay the increased tariffs associated with the private sector
distribution.70 Prior to private control, the public water company had developed
communal taps to grant access to drinking water for those who could not afford a
connection to their homes in certain parts of the Maldonado Department. However, the
private companies that had taken over water services in this area removed these
communal faucets because they wanted to increase their customer base, despite the fact
that many people could not afford the connection costs.71 Further problems arose from
the private sector control when there was an announcement by the state water company
(OSE) in 2002 that the people of Maldonado should, “boil the water distributed by the
Spanish firm (Uragua/Agua de Bilbao) before drinking it, as fecal e-coli bacteria had
been detected in the water.”72 Failing to recognize the problems associated with
privatization, the federal government sent a note to the IMF that same year seeking
additional funding, provided that they continued to increase private sector participation in
services like water and sanitation.73 This letter of intent served as the catalyst for the
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creation of the Comisión Nacional en Defensa del Agua y de la Vida (National
Commission in Defense of Water and Life, CNDAV), which then sought to put an end to
water privatization in Uruguay.74
One year before the next national election, the CNDAV submitted to the national
legislature the 283,000 signatures necessary to have a constitutional referendum against
water privatization included on the 2004 ballot.75 Then on October 31, 2004, 64.7% of
the people in Uruguay voted to amend Article 47 of the constitution stating, “Water is a
natural resource essential to life. The access to potable water and the access to sanitation
constitute fundamental human rights.”76 This measure of direct democracy was
accompanied by the first election of a leftist president, Tabaré Vázquez of the Broad
Front party. These two results were part of a movement by the people of Uruguay to
adopt social improvements through new forms of governance. The election of Vázquez
and constitutional amendment that resulted from the 2004 election is a demonstration of a
shift away from the neoliberal and private influences that had gained significance in the
last two decades in Uruguay, and a resurgence of the role of the central government.
The constitutional amendment guaranteeing access to water for the public can be
seen as a return to the welfare initiatives that dominated early Uruguayan political policy.
As the country experienced increased pressure from international finance institutions to
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divest services and resources to the private sector, the water policy was shown to follow
with the privatization of water services in two provinces. However, as the private sector
failed to improve conditions, and in fact made them worse, the public rallied to remove
the private sector from the distribution of this resource, which they constituted to be a
basic human right. The state has been able to increase access to piped water to 98% (OSE
assessment from company website) and with the support of the World Bank and
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development it is working to improve access
to sanitation as well.77 In the words of David Hall et al., the policy to constitutionalize the
right to water shows, “that social considerations take priority over economic
considerations in water policies.”78 This is important because despite the pressure to
adopt decentralized forms of government by the international community, the people of
Uruguay have instead decided to rely on the state. Furthermore, they have ushered in
government leaders and policies to that effect.
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CONCLUSION
Water policy is a contentious issue because of the difficulty in assigning a
monetary value to something that is quintessential to life. However, throughout the world
just under a billion people still struggle from lack of access to clean water, and even more
from a lack of access to sanitation.79 In 1992, following the Dublin Announcement, there
was a global recognition of the economic value of water, but since then there has been
increasing support to instead recognize water as a basic human right fundamental to “the
full enjoyment of the right to life”.80 Despite the declarations by the UN, there is still
pressure for developing countries to implement privatization of many of their utilities,
including the provision of water and sanitation.
The literature on privatization of water policy is split between those that stress the
economic value of water and those who oppose commoditizing such a vital resource
needed for sustaining human life. There are many who speak out in general, in favor of
one direction over the other, and often cite the countries used in this document. The three
countries are a strong source of perspective for the different outcomes that have resulted
from increased private involvement in water policy and show how the changes to policy
are a reflection of the political and economic circumstances in the country, and not so
much about the role that water plays as a vital resource for life. From the examples of
79

“Millennium Development Goal drinking water target met, Sanitation target still lagging far behind”,
UNICEF Joint Press Release, New York/Geneva, March 6, 2012, accessed 11/30/12,
<http://www.unicef.org/media/media_61922.html>
80
“UN declares clean water a ‘fundamental human right’, The UN has declared that access to clean
water and sanitation is a fundamental human right”, BBC News: US & Canada, July 28, 2010, accessed
11/30/12, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-10797988>

43

Chile, Mexico and Uruguay, the relationship of water policy and conditions within the
government can be seen to varying degrees with different outcomes in each case.
The case of Chile is one of the most widely recognized as a success of
privatization of water rights and services. Privatization came about as a shift away from
the policies of the leftist regime led by President Salvador Allende in the early 1970’s,
and the economic philosophy of neoliberalism implemented by “Los Chicago Boys”.
Despite the argument that water should be provided by the state as a public good because
it is a basic human right, the Chilean government has established private control over
water rights and services with the goal that it would lead to increased efficiency and the
best use of the resource.
This policy has resulted in almost universal access to the resource with increases
in sanitation access. However, the water market that was supposed to follow from the
establishment of private water rights, has not been as profound as anticipated and has led
to owners of these rights to hoard and speculate for personal gain. Furthermore, the
increases in prices for services have led to some families not being able to afford access
to water, which have been met by attempts to address this issue through subsidies for
families demonstrating financial need. The changes to the water policy make it a good
example of the correlation of policy to economic and political pursuits; however, it does
not necessarily mean that it has been the most beneficial policy for all of Chilean society.
Mexico presents a less concrete example of the correlation of water policy to
political and economic influences, and this is primarily the result of the extensive role
that the central government has played throughout the country’s history dating all the
way back to colonization by the Spanish. Most early water policies were a reflection of
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increases in the state’s power and its growing control over the country’s resources. The
vast disparity between the rich and the poor has pressured the government to provide
certain concessions in favor of the lower class, but it still maintained authority over water
resources. For a long period the government provided water to the people at a rate that
was below cost to help ensure access for the lower class.
This unsustainable policy began to crumble as the country found itself increasing
unable to finance improvements to existing water systems or new ones. These water
systems were essential for rural irrigation, which the government had established the
need for by distributing land to the poorer population. Lacking the financial capital to
maintain these projects, the government began to turn over control to private users and
seek additional support from international lending agencies. However, it was not able to
establish sustainable credit because of the lack of cost recovery within the existing
framework. The country continues to face major issues with its water policy as its capital
sinks from depletion of groundwater and it struggles to provide a reliable and clean
product to the citizenry. The current policy of central authority within the federal
government with some private participation has not solved the country’s problems and it
will need to find solutions before the country exhausts its depleting resources of
freshwater.
In the Uruguay case, there has been a tradition of federal support in providing
resources and services to meet the needs of the people. Additionally, it has not faced
some of the major problems associated with a scarcity of water because the country is
relatively water abundant. Without the dire need to implement policies to control water
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use and its equal dispersal, the country has mostly implemented laws to support
governmental authority over water.
The government legacy of acting essentially as a welfare state has caused the
country to experience several periods of economic decline and unsustainable debt. It has
also been economically dependent on its neighbors, so when they have experienced
economic hardships, they have also been felt in Uruguay. The economic issues within the
country have motivated changes to the country’s water policy, especially during the latter
part of the 20th century as most of Latin America was also in economic turmoil and began
implementing neoliberal principles. However, the population, which had grown
accustomed to the benefits provided by the state, has been outspoken against efforts to
increase privatization of water and other utilities.
When the government did allow private firms to provide water services, it proved
to be at a detriment to the country, and the citizens responded by developing legislation to
establish water as a constitutional right. This was a monumental moment in water policy
because it was the first time that a government recognized water as an essential human
right, and outlawed private allocation. Since enacting the amendment, the country has
benefited from an increase in water services to almost the entire population and is
receiving support form international financiers to continue to increase access to
sanitation. There is concern regarding self-regulation of the state owned water company,
but if the country continues to experience progress with this policy, it may set the
precedent for others to follow.
All three of these cases could benefit from additional studies looking at the
changes that have resulted from implementing different policies, especially Uruguay to
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see if its amendment to the constitution serves as a good example for other developing
countries that have had issues with increased private participation. Additionally, the
inclusion of more cases would shed greater light on the importance of political and
economic conditions in establishing correlating water policies. Latin America presented a
strong focus area because it has received so much private investment in utilities and other
services. In general these three case studies demonstrate the complexity of the issue and
the different responses to water policy that can be seen by governments with different
prerogatives.
The highly politicized nature of water policy is due to the conflict of considering
the economic value of the resource and its value to sustaining human life. Without water
we would not survive so it is important for countries to ensure access to the resource, but
the conflicting uses for the depleting resources of freshwater require that certain uses take
precedence over others and that water be recognized for its value. For those that argue
that water should be a public good provided by the state at prices that are below cost,
there is a compelling counterargument presented by Jamie Linton regarding the import
and export of water, which can be interpreted for the general public provision of water,
“Perhaps the strongest argument against [commercial] water export is that it
would only perpetuate the basic problem that has caused the ‘water crisis’ in the
first place—the presumption that people’s growing demands for water can and
should always be met by furnishing an increase in supply.”81

If you interpret what he is saying about the commercial export and import of
water, to the public provision of the resource, those in favor of increased private
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influence could argue that it is the inefficient public provision of water that has led to the
problems of scarcity that countries face today. Thus, unless there is an economic value
associated to the resource people will continue to abuse it and use it without
consideration for improving efficiency or conservation. On the contrary those opposed to
privatization stress the fact of waters importance to sustaining life, and insist that
imposing prices limit access, especially to impoverished members of the population.
Components of both the system in Uruguay and Chile probably present the best
solution to this issue. When Uruguay constitutionally recognized water as a basic human
right, it was a crucial development in water policy because it ensured that the government
was responsible for improving access to the resource for the entire population and made
private involvement illegal. However, many governments lack the financial ability and
technical knowledge that many private companies can provide, so excluding them
entirely could be detrimental. Furthermore, both countries recognized the need for a fair
price of the resource to recover costs from developing infrastructure and delivering the
resource, as well as removing the waste. To assist in serving the poor the use of focused
subsidies, as are used in Chile, could be critical to helping the most vulnerable members
of society maintain access. Without a clear best practice for the distribution of water, it
will continue to remain a highly politicized issue with different approaches taken by
different governments across the globe.
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